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Abstract
In  this  study,  we  employ  the  Harbinson  proposal  and  July  Framework  to 
compare a ‘likely’ Doha scenario with an ‘inclusive’ baseline. The key aim is to assess 
the  impacts  across  EU  member  states.  More  specifically,  we  (i)  employ  the  latest 
version 6 of the GTAP database, (ii) explicitly model CAP mechanisms (e.g., quotas, 
decoupled  payments,  set-aside,  CAP  budget  etc.)  to  more  accurately  assess  the 
asymmetric trade led welfare effects on selected EU member states, and (iii) introduce 
binding overhangs into domestic support, export subsidies and more importantly market 
access  commitments.  Whilst  the  EU  regions  benefit  from  the  multilateral  reform 
proposals, the gains are weakened considerably by the tariff binding overhangs, where 
the  EU25  only gain  ten  per  cent  of  their  potential  trade  led  welfare  gain  from  the 
proposals. On this basis, a more positive stance must be applied if the Doha Reforms are 
to yield a meaningful outcome for all. 3
A CGE Analysis of the Harbinson Proposal:
Outcomes for the EU25
1
1. Background
After six days of intense negotiations, the sixth Ministerial WTO meeting in 
Hong Kong concluded  with a partial deal in  agriculture: total  elimination of export 
subsidies in cotton and agriculture by the end of 2006 and 2013 respectively. Whilst the 
conference, held between the 13
th and 18
th of December 2005, could be regarded as a 
minor success for achieving concrete commitments and time scales,
2 the fact remains 
that the Doha trade talks as a whole have languished since their 2001 launch. Indeed, 
the ongoing impasse over the agricultural ‘modalities’ of market access and domestic 
support has blocked progress in non-agricultural areas, whilst obstructing the objective
of ‘special and differential treatment’ for developing countries, which constitutes a key 
component of the Doha Declaration’s mandate (Anania and Bureau, 2005).
At the current time, the Harbinson draft report (WTO, 2003a; 2003b), named 
after the then Chairman of the Agriculture Negotiating Committee, remains the main 
point of reference in the agricultural modalities negotiations. The ‘Harbinson Proposal’ 
was not the result of negotiations and as such countries were under no obligation to 
accept it. However, the document carried considerable weight owing to the fact that it 
proposed a precise range of commitments and still broadly reflects the consensus of
negotiating  countries’  various  positions  (Anania  and  Bureau,  2005).  Under market 
access, Harbinson suggested the usage of a tiered formula with average tariff reductions 
in bound or ceiling rates for each tariff rate tier (see Table 1), subject to a minimum 
tariff cut per tariff line.
3 The inclusion of a tiered formula, which is a compromise 
between  the  Uruguay  Round  and  Swiss  Formula,
4  circumvents  strategic  high  tariff 
reductions by WTO members in commodities of lesser political importance to meet 
average reduction commitments as occurred in the Uruguay Round. Tariff cuts would 
                                                
1 The author would like to thank the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 
Government of the UK, for sponsoring an earlier version of this research.
2 Even a partial agricultural agreement was seen as politically essential given the failure of the Fifth 
Ministerial  Meeting  in  Cancun  (see  Anania  and  Bureau  (2005)  and Swinbank  (2005)  for  further 
discussion of the political history and development of the Doha Round).
3 In-quota tariff rates are not affected by these reductions.
4 The Swiss Formula employs a single mathematical formula to produce a narrow range of final tariff 
rates from a wide set of initial tariffs implying deeper cuts in tariff peaks than proposed by Harbinson.
The Swiss formula is a function of the initial tariff rate and an exogenous ‘coefficient’. For example, a 
value of 30 for the coefficient implies that all tariffs will be below 30% at the end of the implementation 
period (i.e., ‘tariff harmonisation’).4
be in equal annual instalments over a period of five years for developed countries. The 
Harbinson Proposals also include increased market access through increases in tariff 
rate quotas to 10 % of present domestic consumption. In Export subsidies, the proposal 
favoured full elimination with a heavy frontloading of 50% reductions over the first five 
years, with the remaining half eliminated four years thereafter.
Developed Countries Developing Countries
Existing tariff level (Harbinson’s proposal Existing tariff level Harbinson’s proposal
> 90 per cent 60% > 120 per cent 40%
> 15 and ≤ 90 per cent 50% > 60 ≤ 120 per cent 35%
≤ 15 per cent 40% > 20 ≤ 60 per cent 30%
≤ 20 per cent 25%
Table 1 – Illustration of the Harbinson Formula for average tariff rate reductions
Adapted from: WTO (2003)
Under domestic  support,  the  proposals  suggested  a  60  per  cent  reduction  in 
Amber Box commitments, whilst de minimis spending is to be reduced from 5 per cent 
to 2.5 per cent of the value of agricultural production on product- and non-product-
specific Amber Box programs over 5 years.
5 Blue Box spending is to be bound at 1999-
2001 (average) levels and reduced by 50 per cent over 5 years, or included in the Amber 
Box and effectively cut by 60 per cent. Green box exemptions are maintained with a 
general tightening of certain criteria for program  inclusion, although ‘environmental 
programs’ are expanded to permit payments for animal welfare schemes (as a legitimate 
non-trade concern).
After a series of missed deadlines for agreement owing to large disparities in the 
negotiating  countries’  positions,  an  attempt  to  revitalise  the  talks  and  open  further 
debate prompted the ‘July 2004 Framework’ (WTO, 2004), although this document was 
attacked for being devoid of detail pertaining to specific cuts and time frames for each 
of the agricultural modalities. In terms of domestic support, the consensus was to allow 
gentler cuts over longer periods for the developing countries, whilst a ‘tiered formula’ is 
under consideration such that higher levels of support (those in higher ‘tiers’) will have 
steeper  cuts.  A  much  more  contentious  area  was  the  creation  of  new  criteria  for 
inclusion in the Blue Box. The US, which had moved away from Blue Box support, 
successively  lobbied  to  expand  the  criteria  for  Blue  Box  exclusion  with  a  view  to 
                                                
5 De  minimis:  If  agricultural  support  is  less  than  or  equal  to  the  de  minimis  level  (expressed  as  a 
percentage of the value of production) then subsidies are exempt from cuts. 5
including its counter-cyclical programs introduced in the 2002 Farm Bill.
6 Should the 
US succeed with this initiative, it would grant them considerable flexibility in dealing 
with the proposed reductions (Hart and Beghin, 2006). The Framework also stipulates a 
re-examination of the Blue Box support to ensure that this class of payments (linked to 
fixed production limits) are genuinely less trade-distorting than Amber Box measures.
Moreover, the text includes a proposed cap of five per cent of the value of agricultural 
production on Blue Box measures and a minimum cut of 20 per cent in the Aggregate 
Measure of Support (classified in the Amber Box) within the first year of the agreement 
implementation period. The treatment of Green Box also remains controversial, with 
specific wording in the text to ensure that the basic principle of no or only minimal 
trade distortion is respected. However, the EU is gradually transferring most of its pillar 
one CAP payments to meet current Green Box criteria and will therefore be reluctant to 
see (and unable to comply with) further tightening of disciplines in this area.
In  export  competition,  the July  Framework  remained  committed  to  eliminate 
export  subsidies  by  an  agreed  end  date,  whilst  accounting  for  EU  concerns  by 
broadening  the  definition  of  export  competition  to  incorporate  export  credit 
programmes,  state  trading  enterprises  and  food  aid  not  conforming  to  various 
disciplines.
7 In market access, the July Framework renewed the commitment toward 
banded tariff reductions on bound rates, although the number of bands are the level of 
the reductions are still to be negotiated. Moreover, the text set up three exceptions to the 
application of the reduction formula: sensitive products, special products and the special 
safeguard mechanism. In the first category, all countries may specify an ‘appropriate’ 
number of sensitive products which in turn will face lesser tariff cuts and tariff quota 
increases. In the second category developing countries have recourse, subject to food 
security,  livelihood  and  rural  development  criteria,  to  a  certain  number  of  ‘special 
products’.  Finally,  a  special  safeguard  mechanism  will  be  established  to  protect
developing  countries  against,  for  example,  import  surges  or  large  drops  in  prices, 
however, the precise scope and application of this scheme have still yet to be clearly 
defined.
                                                
6  Counter-Cyclical  (CC)  payments  create  a  floor  price  which  if  touched  triggers  an  automatic  farm 
payment to producers paid per output unit. CC payments are decoupled in that they apply regardless of 
the  level  of  production  although  the  more  produced  the  more  received.  Moreover,  they  are  price 
dependent,  rendering them  not  eligible for inclusion under current Blue Box  criteria. Should the US 
succeed with this initiative, this would, give the US a great deal of flexibility in dealing with the proposed 
Doha constraints.
7 The US has made extensive usage of export credits and food aid, whilst Canada has employed State 
Trading Enterprises for specific commodities.6
2. Literature Review and Study Aims
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database has become something of a 
standard workhorse in multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) multilateral 
trade reform analysis, giving rise to a number of CGE undertakings on the potential 
effects of the Doha Round in the trade policy literature (see Table 2). 
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Table 2 – Previous trade liberalisation estimates
Notes a) Adapted from Renwick et al. (2005); b) Harbinson proposal on agricultural commodities only ; 
c) Swiss Formula on agricultural commodities only; d) Harbinson proposal on agricultural commodities
plus 50% cut in non agro-food tariffs.
A cursory view of the global welfare gains from the studies in Table 2 reveals 
global estimates ranging from $29bn to $384bn, despite the usage of the same base data 
(GTAP). A primary source of change between model results is the choice of modelling
assumptions,  which have the effect of ‘boosting’ welfare  estimates.  For  example  in 
inter-temporal dynamic CGE models, ‘capital accumulation’ through successive time 
periods can greatly increase household incomes compared with comparative static CGE 
model counterparts.
8 The assumption of imperfect competition also raises the welfare 
estimates  through  introduction  of  additional  market  distortions  such  as  ‘pro-
                                                
8 In CGE models, it is normally assumed that the household(s) own the factors of production.7
competitive’ effects in production (Hertel 1994) or ‘love of variety’ effects (Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977) in consumption, which via liberalisation release additional welfare gains 
in  comparison  with  the  standard  model  estimates.  Welfare  magnification  effects  in 
developing  countries  occur  through  the  imposition  of  trade-productivity  linkages  as 
productivity  improvements  in  developing  countries  are  greatly  enhanced  through 
assumptions  of  technology  transfer.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  such  model 
modifications may be based on tentative estimates which may introduce an issue of 
credibility into model outcomes.
9
A secondary source of variation stems from the benchmark year of the GTAP 
data. Version 6 is benchmarked to 2001 instead of 1997 (version 5), and represents a 
significant advance on version 5 in terms of (inter alia) broader regional coverage (87 
regions), improved trade and demand elasticity estimates and perhaps most importantly, 
significant refinements to the tariff protection data. The new protection data come from 
a joint CEPII (Paris)/ITC (Geneva) project. The end product of this collaboration is the 
MAcMaps bilateral tariff database integrating trade preferences, specific tariffs and a 
partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), for example tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
through the calculation of bilateral applied ad valorem tariff equivalents. Accordingly, 
version 6 has lower tariff peaks than version 5, due to the inclusion of bilateral trade 
preferences and policy reforms between 1997 and 2001 (Uruguay Round reductions, 
Chinese Accession). Thus, under tariff reform scenarios, this implies greater welfare 
impacts in the former data version. 
Thirdly, estimates may diverge due to the choice of benchmark for comparison. 
Some CGE studies employ a status quo baseline against which a Doha experiment is 
compared, including additional multilateral reform policy shocks. Clearly, the result of 
the  Doha  experiment  is  conditioned  by  the  underlying  assumptions  in  the  baseline 
pertaining to exogenous growth, endowment and productivity shocks, as well the choice 
of policy shocks (i.e., Chinese Accession, EU Enlargement etc.) over the time line of 
the model experiment. Moreover, further variation occurs within the Doha experiment 
itself based on the tariff reduction formula (see Yu and Jensen, 2005), the treatment of 
the tariff binding overhang (see below), export subsidy and Amber Box ceiling limits, 
                                                
9 For example, in imperfectly competitive industries, data limitations do not allow accurate calibration of 
all industries’ concentration ratios and ensuing benchmark mark-up ratios for each region. Clearly this 
coefficient is critical, where the larger is the mark-up ratio the greater are the potential ‘pro-competitive’ 
welfare gains from liberalisation. In a similar manner, trade productivity growth is determined by an 
‘arbitrary’ technology transfer function.8
the depth and scope of the reforms (e.g., inclusion domestic support and export subsidy 
cuts? agriculture only or ‘total’ trade reform?) and the choice of reforming regions in 
the aggregation.
Of the Doha Agenda studies reviewed, Brockmeier et al., (2003), Yu and Jensen 
(2005) and Bouet et al., (2005) have vastly improved the model treatment from the 
perspective  of  the  European  Union  through  explicit  implementation  of  CAP  policy 
reforms and their associated WTO ceiling constraints.
10 Indeed, all three studies are 
similar in that they  all employ version 5 GTAP data and the reforms are measured 
against  a  long  run  baseline  scenario  including  relevant  ‘background’  macro  (GDP, 
productivity  etc.)  and  policy  (CAP  Reform,  Chinese  Accession,  Uruguay  Round 
finishing  commitments)  shocks.  Moreover,  each  of  the  three  studies  employ  the 
Harbinson tiered tariff reduction formula,
11 although only Brockmeier et al., (2003) and 
Bouet et al., (2005) include export subsidy elimination and domestic support reductions.
The real income gains to the EU25 in Yu and Jensen (2005) and Bouet et al., 
(2005)  are  US$9.109bn  and  US$8.235bn  (1997  prices)  respectively.
12 While  these 
estimates are relatively consistent, this is a surprising result given that in addition to 
market access shocks in  both  studies, Bouet et al., (2005) also include 55 per cent 
reductions in Amber and Blue Box support, export subsidy eliminations and imperfectly
competitive scale effects. The important difference between these studies lies in the 
treatment of the tariff reductions, where Bouet et al., (2005) check for binding overhang
(difference  between  the  bound  (ceiling)  and  applied  rates),  where  a  large  binding 
overhang has little or no effect on real market access (i.e., applied tariff reductions).
13
Indeed, employing version 6 GTAP data, Anderson et al., (2005) also incorporates a 
Harbinson type scenario (excluding CAP modelling) whilst excluding treatment of the
tariff  binding  overhang.  Accordingly,  the  gains  to  the  EU25  and  EFTA  composite 
region relative to a status quo baseline are considerably higher than Bouet et al., (2005), 
                                                
10 In modelling EU domestic agricultural policies, the decoupling of support from production will further 
moderate the welfare and trade effects (from CAP liberalization) compared with the remaining the studies 
in Table 2.
11 Yu and Jensen (2005) also examine the Swiss Formula, whilst acknowledging that the tiered approach 
is the more realistic scenario in light of the July 2004 Framework.
12 In Brockmeier et al. (2003) no welfare gain estimates are presented. Employing the Swiss Formula, Yu 
and Jensen (2005) estimate welfare gains of up to $US24.610bn for the EU25. 
13 The percentage binding overhang, or ‘water in the tariff’, is a percentage point measure calculated as 
((binding-applied)/binding)*100. Thus, an overhang of 50% would suggest that a reduction of at least 
51% would be required in the bound rate before real inroads into market access will be achieved.9
estimated  at  $US28.2bn  (agricultural  reform  only)  and  $US35.7bn  (reform  in  all 
sectors) dollars (2001 prices).
In this study, we employ the Harbinson (WTO, 2003a; 2003b) and subsequent 
July Framework (WTO, 2004) documents to compare a ‘likely’ Doha scenario with a 
baseline scenario and assess the impacts on the EU25. The key features of this study are 
that  (i)  we  employ  version  6  of  the  GTAP  database, (ii)  we  explicitly model  CAP 
mechanisms (e.g., quotas,  decoupled payments,  set-aside, CAP budget etc.) to more 
accurately assess the asymmetric effects on selected EU member states, and (iii) we 
introduce ceiling limits into both domestic support and export subsidy pillars, as well as 
calculating actual tariff reductions employing data on tariff binding overhangs.
3. GTAP Model and Data
3.1 GTAP Data and Aggregation
This study employs the GTAP CGE model (Hertel, 1997) and accompanying 
version  6  database  (Dimaranan  and  McDougall,  2006),  which  contains  a  broader 
regional coverage (87 regions) than version 5 (66 regions) and most importantly from 
the perspective of this study, a full choice of EU25 member states. To maintain the 
model at a ‘manageable’ size, the larger EU regions from the EU15 (France, Germany, 
Italy,  UK)  and  new  EU10  members  (Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland)  are 
disaggregated, along with the Netherlands, Greece and Spain.
14 The EU is completed 
with a rest of the EU15 (Ro15) and a rest of the EU10 (Ro10) region. The remaining 
regions  are  key  players  on  world  agricultural  markets  (USA,  China,  India,  Japan, 
Cairns
15), and the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) group of poor Sub-Saharan and South 
African countries. A Rest of the World (ROW) region captures ‘residual’ production 
and trade flows in our chosen model aggregation. Given the focus on agriculture and 
food,  all  major  EU  crops  and  livestock  sectors  are  disaggregated  from  the  GTAP 
database,  with  remaining  non-agricultural  regions  aggregated  into  ‘raw  materials’, 
‘manufacturing’ and ‘services’ (see Figure 1).
I. Chosen Sectoral Aggregation (22 GTAP Sectors in bold)
Wheat (wheat) – Soft Wheat, Durum Wheat; Other Grains (ograins) – Rye, sorghum, barley, oats, 
                                                
14 The Netherlands (Greece) is the largest net payer (net recipients) per capita to (from) the CAP budget. 
Spain is the largest net recipient from the CAP budget in nominal terms.
15 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Pakistan and Paraguay are not included in the Cairns region since in 
the GTAP database, they appear in regional composites.10
maize, millet, other cereals; Oilseeds (oilseeds) - Rape and mustard seed, sunflower seed, soyabeans, 
olives for oil, cotton seed, sesame seed; Other Crops (ocrops) - Plant-based fibers, flax and hemp, 
coffee, cocoa beans, tea, coconuts, spices, tobacco, table grapes, table olives, table wine, other wine 
nursery  plants,  flowers,  ornamental  plants,  other  final  crop  products;  Vegetables,  Fruit  and  Nuts
(vegfruitnuts)– Potato, peas, cauliflower, tomato, pulses, other vegetables, nuts, olives, onions, apple, 
pears and peaches, bananas, other fruits, citrus fruits; Sugar (sugar) – Sugar cane, sugar beet; Raw Milk
(milk) – Dairy cows and other cows; Cattle and Sheep (catshp) – Male adult cattle for fattening, calves 
for fattening, calves, rearing, heifers, sheep and goats for fattening; Pigs and Poultry (pigspoultry) –
Pigs for fattening, pig breeding, laying hens, poultry for fattening, other animals; Fishing (fishing) – All 
fishing  activities;  Other  Agriculture  (oagric)  –  Paddy  rice,  wool,  silk-worm  cocoons;  Forestry
(forestry) – Forestry; Meat processing (meatpro) – Red meat products (bovine, sheep and goat); Other 
meat processing (omeatpro) – Eggs and egg products, white meat products (pigs, poultry); Vegetable 
oils  and  fats  (vegoilsfats)  –  Coconut  oil,  cottonseed  oil,  groundnut  oils,  oilseed  oils,  olive  oil, 
palmkernel oils, rice bran oils, rape and mustard oils, soyabean oil, sunflower seed oils, animal fats; 
Dairy (dairy) – Butter, cheese, cream, whey and products, skimmed milk; Sugar processing (sugarpro) 
– Refined sugar, sweeteners; Beverages and Tobacco (bevstobac) – Cigarettes, Cigars etc., Wines and 
Spirits, Beer; Other Food Processing (ofoodpro) – Processed rice, sea food products, hides and skins, 
meat and blood meal, edible offals; Raw materials (rawmat) – Coal, oil, gas, minerals, Petroleum and 
coal products; Manufacturing (mnfcs) – Textiles; wearing apparel; leather products; wood products; 
paper  products  and  publishing;  chemical,  rubber  and  plastic  products;  ferrous  metals;  Other  metal 
products; motor vehicles and parts; transport equipment; electronic equipment; machinery and parts.
Services  (svces)  –  Utilities  (Gas,  water,  electricity);  construction;  trade  services;  transport  (air,  sea, 
road);  communications;  financial  services;  insurance;  other  business  services;  recreation  and  other 
services; dwellings; public administration/defence/health, education.
II. Chosen Regional Aggregation (19 Regions)
France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Spain,  UK,  REU15 (Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Finland,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Portugal,  Sweden); Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  RoEU10
(Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia); USA; Japan, China; India; Cairns 
(Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, 
South  Africa,  Thailand,  Uruguay),  Everything  But  Arms  (EBA) (Botswana,  Madagascar,  Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and composite regions for the rest of South- and
Sub-Saharan Africa), Rest of the World (ROW)
Figure 1: Aggregation of Regions and Sectors.
3.2 GTAP Model
16
                                                
16 The standard GTAP model and accompanying database have been used in numerous applied trade 
policy studies on themes ranging from European enlargement (e.g., Bach et al., 2000) and CAP reform 
(e.g., Philippidis and Hubbard, 2003), to multilateral liberalisation scenarios (e.g., Francois et al., 2005) 
and even global climate change (e.g., Burniaux and Troung, 2002). For this reason, we do not provide a 
detailed explanation of the model framework. For further information consult Hertel (1997).11
In the standard GTAP model framework, utility maximisation is employed to 
determine  three  types  of  ‘regional  household’
17  final  demand:  private  expenditures 
(import  and  domestic  demands  for  goods/services),  public  expenditures  (import  and 
domestic demands for goods/services) and savings (investment expenditure). Production 
activities are characterised as perfectly competitive and constant returns to scale. Supply 
is  determined  through  market  clearing  equations  (i.e.,  supply equals  final  demand), 
which in turn drive cost minimising intermediate and factor demands by producers.
18
The  model  incorporates  five  types  of  primary  factors,  of  which  land  is  exclusively 
employed in agricultural activities and moves ‘sluggishly’ between sectors. Given the 
assumption of a long run time horizon in the simulations, we assume full employment 
and perfect mobility in all labour (i.e., wages are fully flexible) and capital markets.
To ensure a general equilibrium (i.e., simultaneous market clearance), a large 
system of market clearing equations are introduced to guarantee that all factor, input and 
commodity  markets  clear.  Moreover,  accounting  identities  ensure  that  regional 
households  and  producers  remain  on  their  budget  and  cost  constraints  respectively, 
household  expenditures  equal  household  incomes  (i.e.,  tax/tariff  revenues  and 
ownership  of  factors  of  production),  and  that  long-run  zero  profits  prevail  in  all 
production sectors. Finally, to apportion investment demands across regions, a fictitious 
agent,  known  as  the  ‘global  bank’,  collects  global  investment  funds  (all  regions’
savings) and disburses them based on fixed regional investment shares.
Once  the  model  structure  is  formalised  and  calibrated  to  our  chosen  data 
aggregation,  specific  macroeconomic  or  trade  policy  scenario  questions  may  be 
addressed  by  imposing  exogenous  shocks  to  key  policy  variables  (i.e.,  changes  to 
tax/subsidy rates, labour supply, technical change variables etc.). The model responds 
with  the  interaction  of  economic  agents  within  each  market,  where  an  outcome  is 
characterised by a new set of interdependent equilibria.
4. GTAP Model Extensions, Scenario Design and Results
In this study we extend the standard GTAP framework to include a plausible 
long run baseline scenario projected from the benchmark year (2001) to 2020 against 
which we compare our Doha Round Scenario. The composition of the baseline scenario 
                                                
17 The regional household is a ‘representative’ accounting entity designed to encompass the activities of 
all  individuals  in  each  region  (i.e.,  as  consumers,  businessmen  (investors  and  ownership  of  factors), 
government activity (tax and spend) etc.) 
18 In GTAP there are no explicit supply functions for goods and services. 12
is presented in Figure 2, whilst full details of the modelling of the baseline are presented 
in the appendix. 
Baseline Scenario Assumptions: 2001 - 2020
1. Projections
Productivity, population change, real growth, skilled and unskilled labour changes.
2. Uruguay Round Commitments
Enforce developed country commitments
Complete developing country commitments
3. EU Enlargement
Remove all border protection (i.e., export subsidies, import tariffs) between existing and ‘new’ member 
states.
Impose common external tariff for all new EU members of the customs union.
4. Agenda 2000 (A2000) commitments and the Mid Term Review (MTR)
Modelling of CAP mechanisms (CAP budget, modulation, quotas, set-aside, intervention prices)
Reduction of intervention prices under A2000 and MTR reforms
Imposition of set-aside for the ‘new’ EU member states
Milk quota adjustments under the MTR. Sugar quota unchanged.
Full implementation of the single farm payment (i.e., total decoupling) under the MTR
Additional compensation for milk and proposed sugar reforms. 
Full  decoupling  of  direct  support  to  tobacco  and  olive  production  under  the  CAP  reforms  for 
Mediterranean products.
CAP budget including the implementation of Modulation funding and the UK Rebate mechanism (which 
is abolished by 2020).
5. Chinese Accession
Unilateral tariff reductions by China
6. Everything But Arms (EBA) deal
Developing country trade weighted tariff rate eliminations by the EU25 on imports from the EBA.
Figure 2: Assumptions shaping the baseline scenario
Comparing  with  the  baseline,  we  implement  a  likely  scenario  based  on  the 
Harbinson proposal and July 2004 framework. Thus, ‘average’ ad valorem tariffs are 
reduced in accordance with Table 1.
19 In addition, we employ bound and applied tariff 
rate  data  for  a  large  number  of  GTAP  sectors provided  in  Buetre  et  al.  (2004)  to 
calculate the binding overhang
20 for each of the chosen regions, which is then factored 
into the Harbinson percentage reductions (see Tables 3 and 5 below). In the case of the 
tariff rate quota routes, we reduce the over-quota tariff rates by the same percentages, 
whilst increasing the quota to 10% of current consumption. 
                                                
19 Given broader sector aggregates in the GTAP, we do not attempt to implement minimum tariff line 
reductions for arbitrary sectors, but merely impose the average reduction for each sector.
20 See footnote 13.13
Moreover, it  is  assumed that the non-agricultural  sectors also have the same 
average tariff rates reductions as suggested by Harbinson for the agricultural sectors. 
Furthermore, we abolish export subsidies and reduce Amber Box (represented as output 
subsidies in GTAP) support by 60 (40) percent for developed (developing) countries. 
Once again, we employ secondary data sources (WTO, 2006) to ascertain the output 
subsidy expenditure overhang when implementing Amber Box reductions. In the EU, 
since the single farm payment (SFP) effectively transfers payments out of the Blue Box 
(as argued by the EU) no respective expenditure limits are implemented, whilst Blue 
Box expenditures in non EU countries are capped at 5% de minimis.
21
A full discussion of all of the model estimates is unwieldy. Thus, in this paper 
we restrict ourselves to an examination of EU trade balances and production, world 
prices  and  EU  welfare  measures.  To  aid  the  exposition  of  the  results,  we  have 
decomposed the Harbinson package into its domestic support, export competition and 
market access components.
4.1 - EU25 Protection, Support and Trade Effects
In Table 3 are presented the average ad valorem applied tariff rates (column 1), 
the water in each tariff (column 2), export subsidy (column 3) and output subsidy rates
(column 4). Column 1 clearly shows a bias in EU25 protective structure toward the 
agro-food sectors (GTAP does not include protection data in services – see conclusions 
section) with average applied tariff rates ranging between 0.1% (oilseeds) to 112.7% 
(sugar  processing).  A  cursory  view  also  reveals  consistently higher  tariff  protection 
across processed food sectors, whilst in primary agriculture tariff peaks appear in ‘other 
grains’ (16.6%)  and  ‘vegetable  fruits  and  nuts’  (16.8%).  In  column  2,  the  binding 
overhang is indicative of the rate of bound tariff reduction necessary to have an impact 
on ‘real’ market access (i.e., reductions in applied rates). Thus, in the EU25, the binding 
overhang is prohibitively high in ‘primary sugar’ (95%) and ‘other meat processing’
(85.7%)  sectors,  whilst  featuring  strongly  in  ‘meat  processing’  (45.0%),  cereals 
(41.2%), ‘sugar  processing’  (37.6%),  ‘pigs and  poultry’ (33.3%)  and  ‘dairy’ (6.2%) 
sectors.
                                                
21 Counter-cyclical (CC) payments constitute a considerable component of US domestic support. Thus, it 
would appear politically improbable that the USA (if successful in transferring CC into the Blue Box) 
will accept significant Blue Box reduction disciplines (of 50% as in Brockmeier et al., 2003), especially if 
the EU succeeds in transferring the majority of its domestic support payments into the Green box under 
the single farm payment.14








wheat 1.2 41.2 7.8 0.9
ograins 16.6 41.2 29.6 0.2
oilseeds 0.1 0.0 0.0 24.2
ocrops 2.8 0.0 0.0 2.3
vegfruitnuts 16.8 0.0 2.2 0.2
sugar 8.4 95.0 0.0 0.3
milk* - - - -
catshp 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.5
pigspoultry 1.9 33.3 0.6 -0.2
fishing 2.5 0.0 0.0 3.5
oagric 11.9 0.0 0.0 -0.2
forestry 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.5
meatpro 45.7 45.0 78.5 0.0
omeatpro 21.0 85.7 5.1 0.0
vegoilsfats 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
dairy 36.7 6.2 27.2 0.0
sugarpro 112.7 37.6 53.1 -0.1
bevstobac 9.3 0.0 0.9 -8.3
ofoodpro 10.3 0.0 3.2 -0.6
rawmat 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.5
Mnfcs 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
Svces 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.8
Table 3: Average applied tariff rates, binding overhangs, average export subsidy 
rates and output subsidy rates for the EU25.
Source: Dimaranan and McDougall, 2006, Buetre et al. (2004) and author’s own calculations.
* Raw milk production is non tradable in GTAP, where all dairy related exports occur in the downstream 
‘dairy’ sector.
Column 3 shows export subsidy protection is largely limited to processed ‘meat’ 
and ‘sugar’, ‘dairy’ and cereals sectors. Indeed, as a policy tool export subsidies have 
declined in importance, partly due to the reforms of the Uruguay Round, partly due to 
the sharp increases in world prices in 2000/2001 (benchmark year of analysis). In the 
case  of  beef  carcass  trade,  the  BSE  epidemic  decimated  extra-EU  exports  from 
numerous member states resulting in zero export subsidies in the benchmark. Average 
output subsidy rates in column 4 incorporate production aid payments (e.g., milk, fibre 
flax, hemp, silkworms) agri-monetary aid, other miscellaneous national payments, and 
national clearance of previous year’s farming accounts (i.e., recovery of overpayments 
to  member  states  etc.),  whilst  the  remainder  is  transferred  into  land  (e.g.,  area  aid 
payments) and capital (e.g., headage payments) subsidies to characterise the decoupled 
nature of EU support.
22 In oilseeds and other crops, higher average subsidy rates largely 
reflect  direct  support  in  the  olive  oil  (oilseeds)  and  tobacco  (ocrops)  sectors.  In
accordance with  the 2004  CAP  reforms  for Mediterranean products,  we transfer  all
                                                
22 Indeed, a number of negative entries under the ‘clearance of accounts’ procedure for 2001 result in 
GTAP data output tax estimates in ‘pigs and poultry’ and ‘other agriculture’ sector.15
tobacco and olive oil production subsidies into the SFP in the baseline (see appendix).
In non-primary agricultural sectors, the negative entry is indicative of a tax.
USA Japan China India Cairns EBA ROW
wheat 0.2 183.0 1.0 28.1 4.1 9.1 9.3
ograins 0.0 38.7 87.7 29.4 4.0 7.7 72.6
oilseeds 2.9 0.2 100.9 35.2 5.0 6.6 54.6
ocrops 2.4 0.9 14.6 12.5 13.6 8.4 9.3
vegfruitnuts 0.6 14.0 24.8 40.2 2.7 15.3 13.9
sugar 0.2 0.0 8.9 3.4 0.7 7.0 20.1
milk* - - - - - - -
catshp 0.0 19.0 3.1 19.8 1.1 14.3 3.1
pigspoultry 0.2 1.9 8.4 7.7 7.3 14.6 4.5
fishing 0.2 3.7 11.5 3.7 4.0 5.2 5.9
oagric 2.0 210.9 1.1 15.7 1.8 5.9 16.2
forestry 0.0 0.1 0.3 6.8 0.3 3.9 2.9
meatpro 2.8 43.2 15.7 24.1 6.4 12.8 18.7
omeatpro 0.6 50.3 14.2 59.5 26.8 20.9 20.6
vegoilsfats 1.0 2.3 12.8 82.6 5.0 17.9 12.7
dairy 18.2 53.1 20.1 33.8 17.7 12.3 15.9
sugarpro 25.3 244.1 18.8 45.7 6.8 18.8 24.1
bevstobac 1.4 15.1 41.3 124.8 16.9 41.1 28.7
ofoodpro 2.5 20.0 17.1 41.0 11.1 23.1 11.3
rawmat 0.1 0.3 3.1 16.1 1.4 9.0 2.6
mnfcs 1.9 1.7 12.8 28.4 4.7 14.3 5.3
svces 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 4: The average applied tariff structure of the Non-EU25 countries.
Source: Dimaranan and McDougall, (2006)
* Milk is non tradable
Table 4 shows the stratification of applied tariff rate protection across the non-
EU  countries.  In  general,  there  is  a  bias  toward  higher  protection  in  the  agro-food 
sectors, although the composition of protection is strongly a function of national country 
interests. Thus in Japan, high tariffs are levied in ‘wheat’, ‘other agriculture’ (includes 
rice) and ‘sugar processing’ sectors, whilst in China tariff peaks are in ‘other grains’ and 
‘oilseeds’ sectors. Note that in India, tariff protection is strong across all sectors, whilst 
in  the US  and Cairns  regions, applied tariff  protection  is  much lower.  The binding 
overhangs for the non-EU regions in Table 5 show a clear disparity between the less 
developed regions (India, EBA, ROW) where the water in the tariff is considerable, and 
the developed countries of the USA and Japan, where the overhang is concentrated in a 
handful of sectors. Thus, the implication is that multilateral liberalisation will open up 
developed  country  markets  considerably  more.  The  Cairns  composite  region  is  a 
mixture of industrialised and developing countries, although comparing across sectors, 16
the binding overhang is the most prohibitive of all the regions in the aggregation.
23 In 
the  opposite  direction,  China  constitutes  something  of  an  outlier  with  a  zero  tariff 
binding overhang, suggesting that the WTO accession package is far more constraining 
than the UR agreement for remaining WTO members.
USA Japan China India Cairns EBA ROW
wheat 0.0 45.5 0.0 61.3 80.0 64.3 34.5
ograins 0.0 45.5 0.0 61.3 80.0 64.3 34.5
oilseeds 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.0 82.1 55.8 66.7
ocrops 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.4 65.2 54.1 56.0
vegfruitnuts 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.3 59.3 31.5 61.4
sugar 100.0 0.0 0.0 68.8 68.6 55.1 57.1
milk* - - - - - - -
catshp 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.0 88.2 6.7 51.9
pigspoultry 0.0 0.0 0.0 71.1 69.2 36.7 57.1
fishing 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.5 70.8 20.0 38.5
oagric 0.0 100.0 0.0 48.3 66.8 44.8 38.7
forestry 0.0 0.0 0.0 64.1 38.7 36.4 61.5
meatpro 84.6 22.0 0.0 65.0 47.3 45.5 41.7
omeatpro 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.8 31.1 44.3 62.5
vegoilsfats 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.5 47.1 46.7 58.6
dairy 56.3 0.0 0.0 43.3 50.2 43.4 41.9
sugarpro 38.1 66.1 0.0 66.9 54.0 53.0 68.8
bevstobac 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.5 47.1 46.7 58.6
ofoodpro 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.5 47.1 46.7 58.6
rawmat 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.5 86.9 72.7 50.0
mnfcs 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 47.3 48.6 50.0
svces 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 5: Binding overhang in the non-EU25 regions
Source: Dimaranan and McDougall, 2006, Buetre et al. (2004) and author’s own calculations.
* Milk is non tradable
Calculating the EU25’s import trade shares from the GTAP database, the main 
agro-food trade partners are the Cairns region (38%) followed by the ROW (33%) and 
the USA (12%). Comparing with these trade partners, EU25 protection is comparable or 
higher in many cases, whilst the binding overhang in the Cairns and ROW regions is 
greater suggesting lower market access for EU25 producers from multilateral reform. 
These factors explain the deterioration in the EU25 agro-food trade balance of €2.161bn 
in Table 6 compared with the baseline scenario. Given zero binding overhang in EU25 
manufacturing, the trade  balance deteriorates -€0.924bn. This is largely due to 50% 
binding overhang in the ROW, which is the largest trade partner in this sector (38%).
                                                
23 The Cairns binding overhangs are calculated employing available applied and bound tariff data for 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada and New Zealand. 17
Meanwhile,  given  resource  reallocation  into  services  production,  the  services  trade 












wheat 405.5 -147.6 17.1 -222.9 48.7
ograins 187.7 -119.3 2.5 -120.0 -1.0
oilseeds -3664.7 51.3 -7.2 24.8 29.7
ocrops -8330.3 119.6 -36.6 155.7 -3.3
vegfruitnuts -7843.0 -244.8 30.9 7.7 -285.2
sugar -7.0 2.7 0.0 0.8 1.8
milk* - - - - -
catshp 92.8 -4.8 -12.5 20.2 -14.5
pigspoultry -805.0 53.2 -12.6 31.0 33.2
fishing -1149.8 11.5 -4.9 10.5 5.4
oagric -1058.7 -66.8 13.7 47.5 -128.0
forestry -1486.6 28.6 -1.0 1.4 28.1
meatpro -1196.5 -229.2 -6.3 -233.2 12.2
omeatpro 1671.5 -272.4 -40.5 -942.5 720.9
vegoilsfats -77.9 -245.4 -77.0 29.1 -202.0
dairy 3900.5 -345.8 3.1 -238.3 -80.3
sugarpro -851.2 -55.7 0.5 -13.6 -42.8
bevstobac 7929.9 -95.4 2.7 -27.2 -71.3
ofoodpro -5934.9 -572.3 27.3 -70.5 -551.5
rawmat -88258.9 161.7 -5.1 0.8 166.5
Mnfcs 82540.2 -924.1 165.6 1553.8 -2646.6
Svces -8129.6 2490.9 42.9 352.6 2086.6
EU25 Agro-Food -16731.1 -2161.2 -99.8 -1540.9 -528.0
EU25 Non-Food -15334.9 1757.1 202.4 1908.6 -365.4
EU25 Total -32066.0 -404.1 102.6 367.7 -893.4
Table 6: Extra EU25 Trade Balance data (€millions, 2001)
compared with the baseline scenario.
* Milk is non tradable
A decomposition of the Harbinson proposal by pillar (columns 3 to 5) suggests 
that export subsidy elimination has by far the greatest negative impact on the agro-food 
trade  balance  (€1.541bn)  due  to  reductions  in exports  of  cereals,  processed  meat 
products,  ‘dairy’  and  ‘other  food’  processing.
25  This  in  turn  leads  to  a  resource 
reallocation  effect  which  improves  both  manufacturing  and  services  sector  trade 
balances by €1.554bn and €0.353bn respectively. Since Amber Box expenditures in the 
EU25  are  someway  below  ceiling  in  2001  (WTO,  2006),
26  their  reduction  in  the 
Harbinson package only slightly reduces  the agro-food trade  balance. Similarly, the
                                                
24 The intra EU-25 trade balance by convention must sum to zero. We do not include intra-EU25 trade 
flows  since  relative  to  the  baseline,  no  policy  shocks  change  (i.e.,  all  protection  eliminated  on 
enlargement). Accordingly, changes in intra-EU25 trade balances are very small.
25 Whilst the  ‘other food processing’ sector  has a  much smaller export subsidy rate than, say,  sugar 
processing, exports from this composite sector are greater.
26  The  ceiling  ratios  are:  EU15,  58.5%;  Czech  Republic,  40.4%;  Hungary,  100%;  Poland,  14.5%; 
RoEU10, 24.9%.18
market access component of the Harbinson package has a muted impact on agro-food 
trade due to the binding overhang. Indeed, in EU sectors with higher (> 10%) average 
applied  tariff  rates  and  a  low  binding  overhang  (see  Table  3)  (e.g.,  ‘vegfruitnuts’, 
‘oagric’,  ‘vegoilsfats’,  ‘dairy’,  ‘ofoodpro’)  the  trade  balance  deteriorates.  A  similar 
result occurs in the manufacturing sector as noted above.  In contrast, in ‘other meat’ 
processing, the binding overhang is high (86% - see Table 3) resulting in no real tariff 











France 1721.0 -442.5 -2.3 -367.4 -76.5
Germany -4876.3 -504.5 11.3 -278.8 -236.3
Greece 255.5 -40.7 5.9 -32.7 -12.9
Italy -2194.3 -209.5 -48.2 -59.5 -100.5
Netherlands -1903.7 -245.4 -17.3 -180.1 -48.6
Spain -3115.1 -252.0 -30.5 -150.3 -69.0
UK -4494.4 -258.9 10.5 -90.7 -178.3
Czech Republic -232.1 -2.6 0.1 1.8 -4.6
Hungary 467.9 36.5 -1.9 19.4 18.6
Poland -65.1 50.2 0.9 29.2 20.5
Rest of EU15 -1922.1 -313.7 -30.2 -169.8 -111.3
Rest of EU10 -372.4 21.9 1.9 32.0 -13.1
EU15 Total -16529.4 -2267.2 -100.8 -1329.3 -833.4
EU10 Total -201.7 106.0 1.0 82.4 21.4
EU25 Total -16731.1 -2161.2 -99.8 -1246.9 -812.0
Table 7: EU25 Agro-Food Trade Balances (€millions, 2001) relative to baseline
Table 7 shows the decomposition of the agro-food trade balance deterioration (-
€3.171bn) by selected EU25 members. Importantly, the ‘old’ EU15 constitutes 105% of 
this loss, where in the ‘new’ EU member states, export subsidies are very minor or 
zero,
27 whilst Amber Box support (with the exception of Hungary) is minimal. In terms 
of market access, the improvement in the Polish and Hungarian agro-food trade balance
is due to the binding overhang (86%) on EU25 ‘other meat processing’ trade. Poland 
trades significantly with the USA in this sector which has zero water in its tariff whilst a 
similar line of reasoning applies to Hungary’s ‘other meat processing’ trade with Japan. 
In the EU15, export subsidy eliminations constitute the most important source of agro-
food  trade  balance  deterioration,  mainly  affecting  France  (-€0.367bn),  Germany  (-
€0.279bn) and the Netherlands (-€0.180bn). Multilateral tariff reductions mostly affect 
Germany (-€0.236bn), the UK (-€0.178bn) and Italy (-€0.101bn). 
                                                
27 With the exception of sugar processing export subsidies in Poland and dairy export subsidies in the 
Czech Republic.19
4.2 Production and Factor Prices in the EU25
Predictably, multilateral eliminations/reductions in agro-food support result in 
production falls in almost all agro-food sectors in Table 8. Notwithstanding, production
and factor price effects are generally small, largely due to the lack of multilateral market 
access  (binding  overhang),  particularly  across  developing  countries.  The  largest 
production falls are in the cereals, ‘vegetables fruits and nuts’, red meat (upstream and 
downstream), ‘dairy’ and ‘sugar processing’ sectors. Elsewhere, white meat (‘pigs and 
poultry’ and ‘other meat processing’) production rises marginally, whilst in the quota 
constrained sectors (‘milk’ and ‘sugar’) only the sugar quota is slightly non-binding, 
Decomposing the results by pillar, export subsidies have the largest negative 
impacts in the cereals, dairy, sugar and meat sectors.
28 Indeed, given that the majority of 
total export subsidies accrue to the EU, this elimination is almost unilateral in nature. 
As noted above, EU25 Amber box expenditures are someway below their UR ceiling 
limits in 2001, whilst the role of this component of CAP support in the post MacSharry 
phase has been much reduced. Thus, 60% Amber Box reductions have negligible output 
impacts.
In the case of market access, the impact on EU25 production is a function of its 
relative competitiveness (applied bilateral tariff), the degree of binding overhang and 
the composition of the EU25’s trade patterns. For example, EU25 ‘wheat’ has a higher 
binding overhang than in the ROW (largest trading partner). Thus, tariff reductions lead
draw  in  additional  wheat  imports  to  the  ROW  from  the  EU25  stimulating  EU25
production. A similar argument applies in ‘other meat processing’ (‘pigs and poultry’) 
on EU25 trade with its principal trading partners, Japan and the USA (USA, China, 
Japan), both of which have zero binding overhangs in their tariff. In remaining agro-
food  sectors,  market  access  has  a  deteriorating  effect  on  EU25  production  levels. 
Impacts in non-food sectors are negligible.
With  reductions  in  primary  agricultural  production,  agricultural  specific  land 
factors fall in value. This impact is stronger in arable land due to contractions in cereals 
and ‘vegetables fruits and nuts’ sectors. Moreover, note that the returns to unskilled 
labour, a significant proportion of which work in the agro-food sector, fall by 0.6%. 
Finally, in skilled labour and capital markets, factor returns are close to zero.
                                                
28 The exception is the ‘cattle and sheep’ sector, which includes beef production. This is attributed to the 











wheat -1.4 0.0 -2.2 0.8
ograins -3.0 0.0 -2.9 -0.1
oilseeds -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2
ocrops 0.1 -0.2 0.4 -0.1
vegfruitnuts -1.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9
sugar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
milk -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
catshp -1.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.9
pigspoultry 0.2 -0.1 -0.8 1.1
fishing -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0
oagric -0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.6
forestry 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
meatpro -2.0 -0.1 -1.4 -0.5
omeatpro 0.3 -0.1 -0.9 1.3
vegoilsfats -0.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.8
dairy -2.5 0.0 -1.6 -0.9
sugarpro -1.6 0.0 -0.8 -0.8
bevstobac -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
ofoodpro -0.9 0.0 -0.4 -0.5
rawmat 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3
Mnfcs -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Svces 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Factor Returns EU25 (%)
Arable Land -4.5 -0.8 -2.4 -1.3
Other Land -1.6 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0
UnSklab -0.7 0.0 0.0 -0.7
SkLab -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Capital -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Table 8: Production and Factor prices in the EU25 relative to baseline.
29
4.3 World Prices
As expected, eliminations/reductions in trade protection stimulate global trade 
demand thereby bidding up world prices relative to the baseline (see Table 9), although 
once again, the limited  depth of the reforms  has  muted  impacts on price increases. 
Sectors with world price increases greater than 1% are ‘wheat’, ‘other grains’, ‘cattle 
and sheep’ and ‘other meat processing’, whilst only ‘dairy’ and ‘sugar processing’ have 
world price rises of greater than 2%. Amber Box support reductions have a negligible 
effect on world prices, whilst export subsidies and market access pillars have varying 
degrees of influence on final world price estimates depending on the product. In dairy, 
the elimination of EU and US subsidies appears to have a greater impact on world 
prices than tariff reductions under the Harbinson proposal. A similar pattern can be 
                                                
29 Note that percentage changes in some cases are from a large base as in composite sectors such as 
manufacturing and services.21
found for ‘sugar processing’ and ‘other meat processing’. In the remaining agro-food 
sectors, market access has an equal or greater weighting on world price rises. Note that 
in primary sugar, the world price falls due to the implementation of the tariff rate quota. 
Thus, increases in quotas and reductions in out-of-quota tariffs reduce quota rent, which 
has the effect of reducing the world price.
30








wheat 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.7
ograins 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.4
oilseeds 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
ocrops 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2
vegfruitnuts 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.4
sugar -0.3 0.1 0.6 -1.0
milk* - - - -
catshp 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.7
pigspoultry 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.5
fishing 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.5
oagric 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.2
forestry 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
meatpro 0.8 -0.1 0.4 0.5
omeatpro 1.5 -0.1 1.3 0.3
vegoilsfats 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.2
dairy 2.9 0.0 1.8 1.1
sugarpro 2.4 0.1 1.4 0.9
bevstobac 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1
ofoodpro 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.3
rawmat 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Mnfcs -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Svces -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Table 9: Changes in world prices relative to baseline
* Milk is non tradable
4.4 Regional Welfare – Harbinson Proposal
Table 10 shows equivalent variation (EV) changes in millions of euros (€m) in 
2001 prices for select EU25 member states and at the global total.
31 The decomposition 
of regional equivalent variation is divided into allocative efficiency effects, terms of 
trade (ToT) effects, a CAP budget effect and ‘other’.
32 The ToT reflect changes in the 
ratio of export to import prices and is a function of a region’s trade pattern, elasticity of 
substitution  parameters  and  level  of  relative  competitiveness  (i.e.,  benchmark  tariff 
rates). In short, the ToT is a measure of the gains/losses from changes in trade flows. 
For example, with unilateral reductions in tariffs, import demands increase (determined 
                                                
30 A similar effect for sugar is noted in Bouet et al., (2005).
31 Welfare changes are defined as Hicksian equivalent variation, which is the income given (or taken 
away) measured in ‘pre-shock’ regional prices (i.e., money metric measure) which is equivalent to the 
utility change in national welfare that follows from the implementation of the Harbinson Package.
32 For a full discussion of equivalent variation welfare decomposition, see McDougall (2003).22
by the elasticity of substitution). To ensure balance of payments exports must also rise 
to compensate, which implies a reduction in the real exchange rate, or regional factor 
price index to improve competitiveness. Ceteris paribus, this would result in a ToT 
deterioration. 
Efficiency is measured as the value of changes in resource or product usage from 
changes a given market distortion (e.g., tax or subsidy). Thus, a tariff on a product 
implies an under usage of resources as the economy is using less compared with free or 
undistorted market forces. Conversely, subsidies encourage over-production (i.e., more 
than under free market conditions) and therefore are a waste of resources (Huff and 
Hertel,  2001).  Thus,  those  activities  which  are  taxed  (subsidised)  have  a  positive 
(negative) marginal social value (Huff and Hertel, 2001). In GTAP, a welfare measure 
of changes in efficiency is based on the quantity usage of a product multiplied by its 
tax/subsidy distortion in money metric terms. For example, reduced (increased) usage of 
a subsidised (taxed) activity implies an efficiency welfare gain.
The CAP budget effect measures the EV changes in the net budgetary positions 
of each of  the  EU  member  states.
33 The  ‘other’  category is  an EV  (money  metric) 
measure of changes in: (i) returns to factors of production from exogenous endowment 
shocks, (ii) values of production and demands from exogenous productivity shocks and 
(iii) population impacts on per capita welfare.
34 The total of these ‘other’ effects are 
relatively small given that these exogenous shocks also feature in the baseline scenario. 
The underlying result is that the Harbinson proposal has a minor positive impact 
of €1.205bn ($US1.349bn) on EU25 real income (0.02% of EU25 GDP). From the
selected  EU  member  states,  the  largest  gainers as  a  proportion  of  GDP  are  Italy 
(0.05%), the UK and Poland (0.04%), whilst the largest net loss accrues to Hungary and 
the rest of the EU10 (-0.07%). Examining the welfare decomposition, the terms of trade 
(ToT) effect is negative in all EU regions. On the one hand, reductions in output and 
export subsidies increase agricultural production prices and free on board export prices 
respectively,  thereby improving the  ToT.  On  the  other  hand,  these  effects  are
outweighed  by  the  market  access  pillar,  where  a larger  binding  overhang  on  many 
competing sector tariffs results in asymmetric market access and sizeable net inflows of 
                                                
33 The CAP budget does not net to zero across the EU25 because the changes are measures in money 
metric (EV) terms which is a function of the price index in each EU region.
34 Due to non-homotheticity of the CDE private demand function, utility is measured in per capita terms 
(see footnote 15). To measure changes in total regional welfare, the equivalent variation measure is the 
income equivalent of the per capita income welfare change multiplied by the change in total population.23
trade to the EU25. To bring balance to the external account, the EU25 must increase 
exports. This can only be achieved through improved competitiveness which implies 
falls  in  factor  prices  (as  seen  in  Table  8),  export  prices,  and  subsequently  a ToT
deterioration of -€0.691bn. This loss is dominated by the EU15 (-€0.634bn) owing to its











France 0.02 248.5 297.2 -116.5 72.3 -4.5
Germany 0.03 526.6 276.4 -42.5 294.1 -1.4
Greece -0.06 -58.1 44.6 -26.1 -73.4 -3.2
Italy 0.05 466.0 222.8 -30.3 278.9 -5.4
Netherlands -0.05 -169.4 160.0 -143.0 -186.2 -0.2
Spain -0.02 -128.0 158.4 -77.8 -203.8 -4.8
UK 0.04 452.9 212.4 -53.0 296.4 -2.9
Czech Rep 0.01 7.1 -1.1 -11.5 21.8 -2.1
Hungary -0.07 -31.9 -2.6 -20.0 -5.8 -3.5
Poland 0.04 67.5 -9.3 -12.8 90.7 -1.1
Rest of EU15 -0.01 -131.9 410.6 -144.8 -385.7 -12.0
Rest of EU10 -0.07 -44.5 2.6 -13.1 -30.5 -3.5
EU15 Total 0.02 1206.8 1782.4 -634.0 92.8 -34.4
EU10 Total 0.00 -1.9 -10.4 -57.4 76.1 -10.2
EU25 Total 0.02 1204.9 1772.0 -691.4 168.9 -44.6
Global 0.03 7135.3 7054.3 38.0 0.0 43.0
Table 10: EV impacts (€2001 millions)
Reductions/eliminations  in  market  distortions  (output  subsidies,  export 
subsidies, import tariffs) have net positive efficiency impacts of €1.772bn in the EU25 
from improved resource reallocation. Notably, 101% of this gain accrues to the EU15 
due to its relative size vis-à-vis the EU10. Moreover, in the EU10 domestic support and 
export subsidy distortions are minimal/zero and the majority of trade is intra-EU in 
nature such that resource reallocation effects are muted. Examining the EV result at the 
global level reveals a real income gain of €7.135bn ($US7.992bn) or 0.03% of global 
GDP, mainly from efficiency gains of €7.054bn.
In  the  context  of  the  literature  review  in  section  2,  our  EU25  and  global 
estimates appear at the lower end of the range of results. There are a number of reasons 
for this  outcome. Firstly,  we  are using  GTAP  version 6  data benchmarked to  2001 
(rather than 1997 in GTAP version 5) resulting in lower tariff peaks and subsidy rates, 
as noted in section 2. Secondly, and most overwhelmingly, we have incorporated a tariff 
binding overhang, which limits the degree of real market access and therefore trade 
gains and welfare. Indeed, the market access pillar in the Harbinson proposal accounts 
for the lion’s share of global welfare gains at €7.014bn (not shown), or 98% of the full 24
Harbinson package.
35 In this context, the comparison of the results between Yu and 
Jensen (2005) and Bouet et al., (2005) in section 2, demonstrates the significance that 
tariff bindings have on potential trade led growth. 
Thirdly, we do not incorporate additional modelling features such as imperfect 
competition  (‘pro-competitive’  and/or  ‘love  of  variety’  effects),  trade-productivity 
linkages or NTB protection (e.g., in services), which whilst ‘boosting’ welfare gains, 
may introduce greater subjectivity into the model framework.
36 Fourthly, the inclusive 
nature  of  our  baseline  discounts  additional  sources  (e.g.,  Enlargement,  Chinese 
accession, Everything but Arms) of trade led welfare gains, whilst we assume that all 
blue box support in the EU faces no discipline as it is transferred into the Green Box 
under the SFP. 
Finally, given the EU significant share of world agricultural market activity, the 
explicit  representation  of  CAP  policy  market  rigidities  (arable  specific  land  factor, 
quotas, set-aside, single farm payment) restricts the responsiveness of resource shifts 
from the agricultural sectors to non-agricultural uses from a policy change. In terms of 
the results, this will have a moderating impact on the efficiency estimates reported in 
Table 10, both within and outside of the EU25.
4.5 EU Budget Effects
The decomposition  of the CAP  budget for  the  member states  is  provided  in 
Table 11, where column 1 shows the change in the net position of each member state. 
This net total is a function of ‘CAP Expenditures’ from Brussels, composed of changes 
in  export  subsidies,  Amber  Box  support  and  intermediate  input  subsidies,  minus
changes in regional contributions to the CAP budget, namely, 75% of agricultural tariff 
revenues and GDP Contributions.
37 Under the Harbinson proposal, CAP expenditures 
shrink by -€3.624bn relative to the baseline due to reductions in export subsidies and 
Amber  Box  support. Tariff  revenues  fall  from  improved  market  access  conditions, 
whilst an additional fall in EU25 GDP contributions is necessary to balance the CAP 
budget. 
                                                
35 The importance of ‘market access’ as a proportion of the total potential trade gains is also a feature of 
other CGE Doha studies in the literature (Renwick et al., 2005)
36 See footnote 9.
37 In the mid term review modelled in the baseline, all blue box support is placed into the single farm 
payment thereby making EU farm support eligible for current green box conditions.  Thus, under the 
Harbinson proposal simulation, no further changes in blue box occur compared with the baseline. See the 















Fra 72.3 -723.6 -620.6 -80.2 -22.8 -46.6 -749.3
Ger 294.1 -394.1 -384.7 -1.2 -8.1 -66.1 -622.1
Gre -73.4 -119.6 -82.1 -36.8 -0.6 -3.5 -42.7
It 278.9 -456.8 -367.6 -78.5 -10.7 -27.0 -708.8
NL -186.2 -390.6 -374.9 -11.5 -4.3 -35.4 -169.0
Spa -203.8 -430.2 -113.5 -313.1 -3.6 -16.7 -209.7
UK 296.4 -183.7 -133.7 -46.3 -3.7 -51.9 -428.2
Cze Rep 21.8 -7.4 -6.3 -0.8 -0.3 -1.8 -27.4
Hun -5.8 -19.6 -0.8 -18.3 -0.6 -0.4 -13.3
Pol 90.7 -7.5 -1.3 -5.6 -0.6 -2.7 -95.5
Ro15 -385.7 -816.2 -566.1 -220.1 -30.0 -28.7 -401.8
Ro10 -30.5 -74.7 -0.8 -73.9 -0.2 -3.0 -41.2
EU15 92.8 -3514.8 -2643.2 -787.7 -83.9 -276.0 -3331.6
EU10 76.1 -109.2 -9.1 -98.7 -1.7 -7.9 -177.4
EU25 168.9 -3624.0 -2652.2 -886.4 -85.6 -283.9 -3509.0
Table 11: Breakdown of the CAP Budget Effect
relative to the baseline (€millions 2001)
Since the UK, Germany and to a lesser extent, Italy, are large net contributors, a 
reduction in the size of the CAP budget brings benefits of €0.296bn, €0.294bn and 
€0.279bn respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, Greece and Spain are large net 
beneficiaries  from  CAP  funding  and  consequently  lose  -€0.073bn  and  -€0.204bn 
respectively from a reduced agricultural budget. France also contributes heavily to the 
CAP budget, but given its large agricultural sector, it also receives substantial market 
support from the CAP. These flows of income largely cancel each other out resulting in 
a net budget effect of €0.072bn. The Netherlands is also a large net contributor, but 
actually loses from a reduced CAP budget since its share of export subsidies, which are 
eliminated, is considerable in proportion to its relative size. The Czech Republic and 
Poland  are  net  beneficiaries  from  the  CAP,  although  the  impact  of  the  Harbinson 
proposal  is  very  minor  since  neither  has  significant  Amber  Box  or  export  subsidy 
protection (the majority is tied up in the single farm payment). Hungary has historically 
been  close  to  or  above  its  Amber  Box  ceiling limit in  local  currency  terms  due  to 
inflationary problems. Thus, its Amber Box reductions from the 2001 benchmark result 
in net CAP budgetary losses.
4.6 Regional Welfare – Total Elimination of Support and Protection.
Before  concluding,  we  compare  the  welfare  impacts  from  our  Harbinson 
scenario with an alternative simulation involving complete elimination of protection and 26
support. By comparing the welfare gains relative to the same baseline, one may gauge 
the relative depth of the Harbinson package from the perspective of the EU25. 
% of 
GDP








France 0.13 1545.0 1340.1 395.3 -207.6 17.2
Germany 0.52 8411.5 1060.9 2396.8 4986.1 -32.3
Greece -1.52 -1577.9 110.5 -400.1 -1296.5 8.2
Italy 0.80 7691.6 779.6 2292.9 4598.9 20.2
Netherlands 0.83 2797.7 481.3 382.8 1929.1 4.5
Spain -0.30 -1552.0 520.0 -265.8 -1823.9 17.7
UK 0.55 7078.4 618.5 2008.3 4433.0 18.6
Czech Rep -4.45 -2157.6 131.8 -473.0 -1823.7 7.3
Hungary -3.80 -1711.7 217.2 -697.6 -1242.2 10.9
Poland -5.23 -8142.3 782.0 -1656.3 -7281.0 13.0
Rest of EU15 0.05 513.2 371.0 122.5 -1.4 21.1
Rest of EU10 -1.74 -1188.7 308.9 -186.5 -1325.6 14.5
EU15 Total 0.36 24907.5 5281.9 6932.7 12617.7 75.2
EU10 Total -4.15 -13200.3 1439.9 -3013.4 -11672.5 45.7
EU25 Total 0.16 11707.1 6721.8 3919.3 945.1 120.9
Global 0.24 67170.6 66424.0 208.9 0.0 537.7
Table 12: EV impacts from total protection and support abolition (€2001 millions)
In Table 12, the global impact of total reform is €67.171bn (US$75.231bn) in 
2001 prices, or 0.24% of global GDP, the majority of which are efficiency gain effects. 
For the EU25, the corresponding statistic is €11.707bn (US$13.112bn), or 0.16% of 
EU25 GDP. Moreover, comparing Tables 10 and 12 the Harbinson proposal accounts 
for 10.6% of the potential net global gains from trade liberalisation. A corresponding 
comparison for the EU25 reveals that the Harbinson package only yields 10.3% of the 
‘potential’ net welfare gains. 
The changes in EU welfare are largely explained by the net CAP budget effect. 
The estimates predict large welfare gains to the EU15 and equivalent losses to the newer 
EU members, principally due to the abolition of all the single farm payment. In the 
EU15, the losses to net beneficiaries such as Greece and Spain are far outweighed by 
gains  to  net  contributing  EU15  regions  (UK,  Germany,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands). 
Meanwhile, of the net loss in CAP budgetary support of -€11.673bn to the EU10, over 
half (-€7.281bn) accrues to Poland. Full liberalisation also leads to sizeable increases in 
efficiency gains (€6.722bn), whilst full reciprocal access to non-EU25 markets yields 
greatly  improved  terms  of  trade  gains  of  €3.919bn  as  the  EU15  take  advantage  of 
greater market access and substantial improvements in world prices. Given the EU10’s 
greater emphasis on intra-EU trade, these members are not able to take advantage of 
higher world prices, whilst also losing trade activity with EU15 members, resulting in a 27
ToT loss of -€3.013bn. It should,  however, be  stressed that losses  to the EU10 are 
relative to the baseline, that is they erode to an extent the significant gains accruing to 
these members from EU membership in the baseline.
5. Conclusions.
Over recent years, the applied trade literature has consolidated with respect to 
the  current  WTO  trade  talks  with  coverage  of  a  broad  range  of  potential  scenario 
outcomes. However, given the emphasis on development issues in the Round, there is a 
dearth of analysis on the European perspective from the trade round. In this study, we 
employ the Harbinson (WTO, 2003a; 2003b) and subsequent July Framework (WTO, 
2004)  documents  to  compare  a  ‘likely’  Doha  scenario  with  a  baseline  scenario.  A 
specific aim is to assess the impacts across EU member states. More specifically, the 
key features of this study are that  we (i) employ the latest version 6  of the GTAP 
database, (ii) explicitly model CAP mechanisms (e.g., quotas, decoupled payments, set-
aside, CAP budget etc.) to more accurately assess the asymmetric trade led welfare 
effects  on  selected  EU  member  states,  and  (iii)  introduce  binding  overhangs  into 
domestic support, export subsidies and more importantly market access commitments.
Comparing with other similar Doha studies, we note that our EU and global long 
run estimates are limited. This is largely due to the tariff binding overhang, which to our 
knowledge is a modelling feature of only one other published study (Bouet et al., 2005). 
Other factors are also cited to explain the relatively smaller size of our welfare estimates 
including  the  choice  of  modelling  assumptions  (no  imperfect  competition,  no 
productivity gains, no NTB estimates, explicit CAP modelling), the use of version 6 
GTAP data and our scenario design (no EU25 blue box disciplines, binding overhangs 
on Amber Box support
38, inclusive baseline scenario). Furthermore, there are possible 
additional effects from export credits, food aid and State Trading Enterprises (STEs)
and non tariff barriers, particularly in services sectors. In the former, none of the CGE 
Doha  studies  incorporate  speculative  market  management  instruments,  whilst  an 
assessment of their potential trade distorting effects is unclear. Hoekman and Messerlin 
(2006) take the view that credits and STE’s are of little significance relative to export 
subsidies, whilst McCorriston and Maclaren (2005) conclude that STE’s may, under the 
correct circumstances, have notable trade distorting effects. In the latter, the standard 
                                                
38 Indeed, it is noted in Anderson et al., (2006) that, “extraordinarily large reductions in bound Aggregate 
Measure of Support are required before any reductions in actual support would occur” (p338).28
GTAP database does not include services trade protection, although one CGE Doha 
study (Francois et al., 2005) attempts to bridge this gap by estimating tariff equivalents 
for service sector NTBs. The welfare estimates of their study (including NTB reform)
are the  largest  of  all  the  ‘partial’  (i.e.,  non  100%  elimination)  liberalisation  studies 
reviewed in Table 2, although the ‘true’ values could be considerably larger.
Summarising our results for the EU25, we estimate a slight long run decline in 
arable, dairy and processed sugar activities, whilst there is substitution from red meat 
into white meat production. Given the contraction in primary agriculture, returns on 
agricultural specific land factors fall (mainly from export subsidies in the case of arable 
land), whilst unskilled labour wages also fall slightly. With asymmetric market access 
due  to  the  tariff  binding  overhangs,  the  EU25  agro-food  trade  balance  deteriorates 
€2.161bn. World prices, as expected rise from the Doha reform scenario, although such 
rises are less than 2 per cent for most sectors (except ‘dairy’ and ‘processed sugar’ 
sectors).
In the welfare results decomposition, tariff binding overhangs lead to limited 
efficiency gains and negative terms of trade effects in the EU. Decomposing the welfare 
gains, the global estimates show that market access accounts for the vast majority of 
real income trade gains. A similar pattern is observed for the EU, although as the main 
employer of export subsidies, their elimination has proportionally much greater impact 
on the positive efficiency gains which offset the terms of trade losses in the EU25.
Comparing  across  EU  members,  the  EU15  benefit  considerably  more  from  greater 
extra-EU trade linkages, whilst net contributing EU members (Germany, Italy, UK) reap 
the largest gains from the Harbinson package. Clearly, considerable work is to be done 
at the negotiating table if a trade deal is to be struck. However, if the results of our 
analysis are to be believed – that the EU25 is only realising 10% of its potential welfare 
benefit from implementing the Harbinson tiered formulae – the EU, US and Japan must 
take a much more positive stance in forging a meaningful outcome from the ongoing 
trade talks.
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7. Appendix – Characterising the Baseline in the GTAP Model.
1. Projections:
Annual  average  percentage  changes  over  the  long  run period  are  collected  from other  CGE 
studies (Frandsen and Jensen, 2001; Jensen and Frandsen, 2003) other data sources (World Bank, 2005) 
and  the  author’s  own  calculations  to  reflect  increases  in  skilled  and  unskilled  labour  endowments; 
population; total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture, industry and services sectors; and real GDP 
growth. Capital endowment growth is calibrated to changes in the projections shocks.
2. Uruguay Round (UR) Commitments.
Given the benchmark year for the data is 2001, developed countries (DCs) have completed their 
UR commitments. Thus, in the baseline  we merely enforce the ceiling  limits on  output and export 
subsidy  expenditure  for  the  developed  countries  such  that  WTO  members  do  not  breach  their  UR 
commitments. For export and output subsidies, we employ WTO subsidy expenditure notifications data 32
(Elbehri,  2005;  WTO,  2006)  to  calculate  applied  subsidy  expenditures  in  2001  as  a  percentage  of 
allowable  UR  subsidy  expenditure  limits.
39 The  allowable  ceiling  limits  are  imposed  employing 
complementary slack conditions in GEMPACK (Bach and Pearson, 1996). For the developing countries, 
a linear time path is assumed where in 2001 it is assumed that 7/10
ths of the UR commitments (1994 –
2004)  have  been  met.  Thus,  remaining  UR  commitments  are  based  on  the  remaining  3/10
ths  of  the 
required total expenditure reduction.
Bilateral tariff rate reductions are implemented  as percentage reductions in the exogenous 
tariff variable in the GTAP model. As in the previous section, for the developed countries it is assumed 
that in 2001 all the tariff rate commitments of the UR have been met. For the developing countries we 
again assume that a linear time proportion (7/10
ths) of the commitments have been met, with a remaining 
3/10
ths proportion reduction imposed. For the Rest of the World (ROW) composite region, a component 
part consists of developing country members. Thus, a GDP share weighted reduction in the ROW’s tariffs 
is incorporated to account for the remaining developing country UR commitments.
On a number of bilateral routes in the model, we have included tariff rate quotas (TRQs), that 
is, we have simulated an import quota with in-quota and over-quota tariff rates. In the model, TRQ’s are 
represented by a conditional complementary slack statement pioneered by Elbehri and Pearson (2005) 
which is a function of the ‘fill rate’ of the import quota (i.e., in-quota, on-quota, or over-quota) and the 
tariff rate (in-quota tariff, over-quota tariff, on quota tariff). 
To identify TRQ bilateral routes, we employ the Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD), 
which provides necessary estimates of in-quota tariff rates, over-quota to in-quota tariff ratios and quota 
fill rates. However, in some cases the broad sectoral aggregation excludes the possibility of including 
TRQ’s on narrow product definitions which will only account for a minority proportion of trade along the 
route.  A similar  argument  also  applies  to  the composite  ROW region  which includes a considerable 
number of regions which do not employ TRQs and for simplicity is excluded from the TRQ treatment. 
Furthermore, given the completion of the EBA deal, EU TRQs on ACP countries are also excluded.
3. Enlargement Shocks – Border Protection
All tariff rates and export subsidy expenditures are eliminated on trade between the EU15 and 
the  accession  members  and  on  intra  EU10  trade.  Further  tariff  shocks  are  introduced  on  accession 
member non-EU imports to mimic the EU15 average common external tariff (CET) in 2020. 
4. Agenda 2000 (A2000) commitments and the Mid Term Review (MTR)
To characterise sugar and milk quotas we employ complementary slack equations (Bach and 
Pearson, 1996) to allow binding/non-binding status of the quota. Changes in the milk quota allocations 
under  the  MTR  are  imposed  as  shocks  to  the  exogenous  production  limit  variable,  whilst  actual 
production is endoegenous  and  may be  less than or  equal to  this level of production. For  the ‘new’ 
accession members milk quota rights in 2001 (EC, 2003) are compared with granted quota rights on 
accession (Jensen and Frandsen, 2003) to calculate quota allocation reductions. Quotas in the primary 
sugar sector remain untouched for the EU regions, whilst the EU10 sugar quota is set at the level of 
production in the accession year (2004). Equally, we follow Lips and Rieder (2005) by assuming that the 
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focus on export expenditure since between the two constraints, this is usually the more binding (Frandsen 
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quota rent accruing to EU15 members is already capitalised within the value of sugar/milk production in 
the GTAP model. Employing estimates of milk and sugar quota rents by EU15 region from Francois et 
al., (2005) and Frandsen et al., (2003) respectively, we strip out the quota rent from the payments to the 
factors of production in the 2001 benchmark database such that zero profit production decisions in the 
model are based on shadow prices (i.e., net of quota rent values) in accordance with the microeconomic 
analytics of quota behaviour. The remaining quota rent is now inserted as a separate income identity in 
the regional household income function. Since the benchmark period is a pre-accession time point for the 
EU10, their quota rents are zero in 2001. Subsequent imposition of the quota through complementary 
slack conditions allows the model to calculate endogenously the level of quota rent in the ‘new’ member 
states. 
To  characterise  the  set  aside  of  land  we  employ  a  productivity  variable  (afeall),  where  a 
percentage reduction in afeall in the arable land using sectors by 10% implies that for every hectare used, 
only 0.9ha is productive. We assume that for the EU15, the GTAP benchmark data implicitly includes set 
aside reflected by the levels of production and demand for land in 2001 (benchmark year). Thus, no 
change to EU15 set-aside is implemented. In the EU10, the Commission’s “prospects for agricultural 
markets” document (2004-2011) suggests that due to ‘small farm exemptions’, set-aside will be some way 
below the mandatory 10%. Thus an arbitrary 5% set-aside is imposed. To eliminate the possibility of land 
reallocation from arable to non arable sectors (as in the standard GTAP specification) in response to 
productivity reductions in arable land, we explicitly separate the land endowment into arable and non 
arable components (i.e., create two land factors). In this way, the elasticity of substitution between arable 
and non-arable using sectors is zero. This also reflects the notion that very little arable land is used for 
pasture purposes. The total arable (and pasture) land endowment is held fixed to reflect a fixed base 
arable land area. The quasi-decoupled nature of area and set-aside payments in 2001 is characterised as an 
input subsidy to the land factor in the GTAP model data.
Comparative static CGE models are generally based on medium to long run model assumptions 
(i.e., full employment, perfect mobility of factors, long run investment behaviour). As a result, we choose 
not to  incorporate intervention buying  which is  a short run market  management  mechanism, thereby 
having  limited  effects  on  long  run  price  and  output  trends.  Following  Frandsen et  al.,  (2003), 
intervention  price  falls  are  introduced  in  the  ‘wheat’,  ‘other  grains’,  ‘meat  processing’,  ‘dairy’  and 
‘sugar processing’ sectors as percentage reductions in export subsidy border support. In the former three 
sectors, intervention price reduction shocks account for the fact that the reductions began before 2001. In 
accordance with the Mid Term Review agreement, we reduce the dairy sector intervention price 25% 
(introduced from 2005 in three equal stages). Finally, the proposed reforms for the sugar sector suggest a 
39% reduction in the intervention price for white sugar and a 42.6% reduction in the intervention price for 
beet sugar. The GTAP data does not separate beet from cane production. Thus, we assume an aggregated 
40% reduction in the sugar sector intervention price. 
The benchmark year (2001) of the GTAP data falls within the reference period (2000-2002). 
Thus, as a starting point it is assumed that the EU15 direct payment totals
40 received in the GTAP 2001 
database are indicative of the value of the single farm payment (SFP) reference payment total for each 
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EU15 region. This total is adjusted to account for the fact that the SFP only applies to 10% of the set 
aside area. Thus, if a farm (region) has 14% of the land area set aside in the reference period, that region 
will only receive 10/14
th’s of the payment from set aside, and 90/86
th’s of the payment from the area 
premium. Further adjustments to the SFP totals are also made to incorporate additional milk and sugar 
sector  premium  payments  to  compensate  for  approved  and  planned  (respectively)  intervention  price 
reductions. Estimates of member state milk premium totals are based on projections of output per cow per 
EU member multiplied by dairy herd projections for each member multiplied by premium per unit. For 
the sugar sector, the EU has set aside 1.5 billion euro to compensate all 25 member countries for the 40 
per cent price cuts. Thus, each EU region’s projected allocation is based on regional sugar beet area 
shares. Once each EU region’s SFP is calculated, 5% of the total is removed as part of the modulation 
scheme to divert funds to rural development needs.
41 Finally, in accordance with the CAP reforms for 
Mediterranean products, all tobacco and olive oils production subsidies are to be included in the SFP.
In  addition,  the  Spanish  government  negotiated  additional  compensation  of  €20million  from  the 
Mediterranean products reform package.
It  is  assumed  that  by  2020,  all  EU  regions  will  have  adopted  the  ‘maximum  decoupling 
scenario’. Thus, to model the single farm payment, all direct payments are removed from each of the 
regions and reintroduced as a uniform input subsidy (i.e., hectare premium) payment on the land factor
(Jensen and Frandsen, 2003). In this way, all agricultural activities receive  the same reward, thereby 
making the payment production neutral. To implement SFPs and modulation contributions for ALL 25 
EU members we follow a three-stage process. Firstly, calculated net totals (after removal of modulation 
contributions) for the EU15 members are allocated such that land premiums are equal across all using 
sectors whilst respecting precalculated payment totals. Subsequently, an average EU15 land premium is
calculated  and  uniformly  imposed  in  the  EU10 regions.  This  provides  an  estimate  of  the  accession 
members SFP totals as calculated by the model. Finally, EU10 accession member SFP totals are reduced 
5% for modulation and then re-implemented ensuring that hectare premium values are equal across all 
agricultural sectors.
The  allocation  of  total  modulation  contributions  from  across  the  EU25  follows  the 
Commission’s proposals. Thus, regional allocation shares are based on the agricultural area shares (65% 
weighting) and agricultural employment shares (35% weighting). This weighted estimate is subsequently 
corrected employing a relative GDP per capita weighting. A further constraint is imposed within the 
model to ensure that all regions receive at least 80% (as specified by the European Commission) of their 
initial modulation contributions. 
In the 2001 benchmark, the CAP budget only applies to the EU15 regions. Thus, each EU15 
regions makes contributions to Brussels in the form of modulation funds and 75% of agricultural tariffs, 
and gains receipts on output subsidies (Amber Box), direct payments (land and capital subsidies) and 
intermediate input subsidies (i.e., payment aids on seeds, forage, silage, disease and pest management 
etc.). The difference between total receipts and total contributions by each member gives the net resource 
cost of the CAP which is met by uniform percentage GDP contributions by each member state such that 
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the total CAP budget balances at zero. This implies that at the member state level, a region may be a net 
contributor (e.g., UK, Germany) or a net beneficiary (e.g., France, Spain) from the budget. In the case of, 
for  example,  Spain  (UK),  this  would  imply  that  regional  incomes  exceed  (are  less  than)  regional 
expenditures. Thus, to restore general equilibrium, regional savings are increased (reduced) to restore 
parity. Thus, at the EU level, savings remain unchanged. Over the time frame of the experiment, the EU 
and consequently the CAP budget expands from 15 to 25 members. Thus, dummy variables are employed 
to  introduce  the accession  members into the  budget  mechanisms.  The  analysis  also includes the UK 
rebate  mechanism,  where  66%  of  the  UK’s  net  contribution  is  refunded,  whilst  the  remaining  EU 
members  fund the  bill  based  on GDP  shares.  In the  case of  Austria,  Germany,  the  Netherlands and 
Sweden, their share of the refund bill is reduced to only one quarter of their GDP share. In each of the 
simulations, it is assumed that the rebate mechanism is eliminated by 2020.
5. Chinese Accession
To characterise Chinese Accession, we exogenously reduce unilateral tariff rates to meet target 
projected post accession tariff estimates from Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003) 
6. Everything But Arms
In the Everything But Arms (EBA) deal, we capture long run tariff eliminations by the EU25 
on imports from Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
and composite regions for the rest of South- and Sub-Saharan Africa.